Haiti and the Economics of Kidnapping
Has the astronomical rise of kidnappings in Haiti brought much discussion on the need for radical change? Not really. Instead, conversations on Haiti seem to remain in a never-ending cycle of doom and gloom. In Haiti and the Economics of Kidnapping, I seek not only to speak of the events that contribute to and condition the current socio-political climate but also the incentives that perpetuate the rise of kidnappings and the inability of national institutions to function as they ought to.
I am somewhat ashamed to say that I have not been to Haiti since the late 80s. At that point, I was still too young to really retain what I heard and saw. I vaguely remember a house in the countryside that was close enough to a pond where I often saw frogs. I also remember being close enough to a carnival to hear gunshots go off. The latter is a story I have never told my parents about. They probably would have had unforgivable words for the person that took us.
What I can tell of the experience was that it was in the northern part of Haiti. It was either in Cap-Haïtien, which (seeing that it is the city of my birth and land of my ancestors) we normally refer to as Au Cap, or elsewhere in the normal. It was probably Au Cap. Either way, I remember the music, the moving of the masses in rhythmic cadences, and the color-filled warm tropical air. None of that prepared my innocence for the sudden bang and the rush that took place as dancers and spectators turn runners while not being aware of where the shot came from. I have never sorted out what really took place that day.
After that, I can only recall bits and pieces of a land and time that is now far off. The faces of the past are unseeable. The voices are speaking with the deafening tone of silence. I went through my teenage and young adult years not focussed on making that visit a reality. The world of right now was tangible, colorful, and noisy. The world of yesterday was projected on television screens as a land of misery and suffering.
Fast forward to the present and (while I still hope to go someday) I’m not particularly gung-ho about the prospects of a visit. A Do Not Travel advisory certainly makes my visit a no-no at this time. As someone with an American passport, I don’t need to be anywhere near Port-au-Prince, the newly crowned “kidnapping capital of the world” (Paul Angelo in New York Times). This is not exactly the sort of award a city thrives for.
A Dead President, A Government in Disarray, and the Ascent of Kidnappers
The Context of the Recent Ascent of Kidnappers
$17 Million is being requested for the release of 17 members of a missionary group by a gang called 400 Mawozo in Haiti. This kidnapped group is said to include five children. There is an 8-month old, “3, 6, 14 and 15 years old.” 400 Mawozo is believed to be a gang that originated in the “eastern district of Croix-des-Bouquets” (WSJ).
This comes on the heels of a tumultuous year in which the sitting Haitian President was brutally assassinated. Suspicion of high-level involvement is widespread. One of those suspected was now-former Prime Minister, Claude Joseph. In an article entitled Should Claude Joseph Have Stepped Down? I argued against the basis for his removal. See the article for the position I still stand by. The new Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, is also suspected of participating in the assassination of Moïse. There has been a call by some for his resignation.
Lots of talks of who done it without a solid base on which to stand. Speaking from the perspective of the diaspora, it all seems like a big guessing game. It may actually be worst. All of this pointing of fingers can simply be a ploy by powerful groups (or families) to deflect attention from their neck of the woods. Yet, the drama continues. The theater is open. The show is set on the grand stage of Haitian politics.
President Moïse’s widow has “filed the complaint against Ariel Henry because, according to reports and Digicel, he had telephone conversations with Joseph Félix Badio on the night of the murder” (Haitian Times). Badio is “a former official with the Ministry of Justice” (BBC). Understandably, such allegations towards members of an already shaky administration further fuel distrust, outrage, and rebellion. Haiti may be on the precipice of a revolution aimed at removing governing officials.
Moïse’s Death and the Rise of Kidnappings
High Amounts of kidnappings existed prior to Moïse’s killing. However, according to the Center for Analysis and Research for Human Rights, there has been a “300 increase” since July (CNN). Moïse was killed on July 7. It is not clear whether or not his death had anything to do with the jump. The jump is there to be noted nonetheless. It is as if the floodgates have been opened.
Was Moïse part of the problem? While he claimed to have been trying to deal with the problem, human rights analysts at Harvard believe Moïse and his government to have funded and supported gang activities in Haiti. “Moïse administration officials planned the attacks or otherwise assisted by providing the gangs with money, weapons, or vehicles” (Human Rights@Harvard Law). He was believed to be especially tied with the G9 gang, headed by Jimmy Chérizier (Barbecue). Barbecue deny that claim (Washington Post). These accusations came despite Moïse’s address in January calling for the coming together of the police and the people in an effort to “to grab the thugs by the neck” (InSight Crime).
Eduardo Arcos, writing in Forbes, states, “during the first three months of 2021, approximately 10% of all reported cases in the Americas occurred in Haiti, despite the island-nation having less than 1% of the region’s population” (Forbes). This is insane. He goes on to say that this is still a conservative number seeing that not all incidents get reported for fear of a response from the gangs.
Thus, leaving us with a view that security forces are unable to ensure the neutralization of real and anticipated threats.
An Introduction to the Economics of Kidnapping
When Funds Go Missing
Discussions of economics in relation to Haiti must begin with the funds that were promised as response to the 2010 earthquake. The numbers are much too large to be ignored. Imagine the good it could have done the nation if those were well managed. Next, the Worldbank canceled the debt Haiti owed as a response to the country’s dire need due to the quake. Where are the funds? What has been the definitive result of so-called investigations? The latter is what most worries me.
Not to mention, Haiti was invited by Venezuela to join in its PetroCaribe program which allowed the borrowing of oil while deferring payments “on 40% of what they bought for up to 25 years, charging a low rate of interest for the debt. Recipient governments then sold that oil and used the proceeds to pay for social programs. With global oil prices at record levels in the early years of the program, the oil sales generated a lot of cash” (Time). As the popular slogan goes, “Kot Kòb Petwo Karibe a?”
Kot Kòb Petwo Karibe a?
Where is the Petro Caribe Money?
As puzzling as the whereabouts of these funds have been, what is most frustrating is the seeming inability of any recognized fiscal authority to even appear to begin to wrest with these discrepancies and disappearing monies. It appears that the governing power is either unable or unwilling to address these issues head-on. To be fair, so-called first world white-collar criminals, masked in the disguise of corporations and men with large pockets, don’t always see the speedy hand of justice. The notable difference is the blatant thieving of public funds in places like Haiti and the rest of the post-colonized world.
Haiti and the Ransom Business
With most of the country’s wealth in the hands of a few, the gangs find an ample supply of youths willing to join to better their economic outlook (Arcos, Forbes). The business of kidnapping is booming. “Kidnapping has proven lucrative at a time when Haiti’s economy is teetering” (Reuters).
In a 2016 article, Anja Shortland, Professor of Political Economy at King’s College, London, looks at kidnapping through economic lenses. Shortland identifies the three parts of kidnapping in the form of problems: “problems of trust, problems of bargaining and problems of execution.” While the end goal of a kidnapping transaction is the release of the kidnapped, the concern remained that an effective transaction may serve as an enabler (Shortland, Washington Post). For a more rigorous take, see Shortland’s Kidnap: Inside the Ransom Business (2019).
Shortland speaks of negotiators finding themselves in the unenviable position of securing a release while in the meantime hoping not to encourage future kidnappings. Plenty of examples exist of the implication of working out these complicated details. A wrong turn can result in the death of an otherwise freeable person.
Plata O Plomo
Pablo Escobar
Not all kidnappings are transactional in nature. Not all kidnappings are opportunistic occurrences by those willing to go the distance to fill their pockets through the negotiating tactics of plata o plomo (silver or lead). There are kidnappings in Haiti (and elsewhere) wherein an opposing gang member is snatched up, held, and tortured for a period, and then killed. There is a certain type of value attributed to such an act. But there is no exchange of goods, monies, or services.
Attempts at those exchanges are necessary in order to be recognized as transactional in the economic sense. The taking of persons without their consent upon threat of death or harm in order to secure their release through money constitutes a business transaction in a black market. Such an event has economic relevance to kidnappers and affects their financial status. The purpose of the act is, ultimately, to secure funds. If there were no reasonable chance at the funds then the kidnapping would lose its incentive.
Thus, (and the point should be bright as day by now) kidnappings in Haiti that come in view of the nation and/or the international community are those that only recognize bullets and dollars as primary transactional terms for the release of nonviolent actors; civilians and tourists that pose no threat to the kidnappers. These are transactional in the sense that they involve dollars.
Kidnappings in Haiti are even more complicated due to misinformation in terms of the financial status of a company or person. I have personally heard of members within my faith denomination being kidnapped in exchange for ransom amounts that neither church nor person had. Were the kidnappers to have done more research or had better information, they would have been able to label this as an unnecessary risk. But being that the state of this black market runs wild and undeterred by authorities, the risk involved with being wrong is not that high.
Towards A Resolution
The intent in writing this article is simply to explore the often-ignored drive behind the rise of kidnapping: dollars. It was not to provide a solution to the never-ending cycle that better minds on the ground have yet to resolve. We can say that Haiti needs (1) a robust security force to serve as a deterrent, (2) harsh sentencing and/or penalties for kidnappers, and (3) a secured judiciary that is able to carry out the due process of trials. This is not news. Experts on the ground have smart approaches towards making these three central issues a reality.
However, it all trickles down to those at the helm of the nation’s executive branch. If the buck has to stop anywhere, it has to stop with those responsible for ensuring the security of Haiti’s people and economy. While external forces have imposed strong-arm tactics over and over on the nation, it can’t be said that Haiti has witnessed determined leadership standing steadfast against threats both foreign and domestic. If such arguments exist, I’m not convinced.
Rather, some enter positions poor and leave with filled pockets. Apart from the black market of kidnapping, there is a market that seems to be functioning at the highest level in the country. Continuing to fail to address this very real reality will only result in things continuing to be as they are. Haiti needs a revolution. No, not the one being sought after by Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier.
Haiti needs a revolution led by its heart and soul: young people. Change in Haiti will not come until the youth of the land rise up and take over the establishments. This requires the projection of a vision to the youths of the Haitian street that sees greater things than these scenes of kidnappings, burning tires, brutalized masses, and malnourished babies. I’m not talking about armed civil war. I’m talking about the gathering of all of the nation’s youths in defiance of the cyclical nature of things.